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The subprime crisis has revealed many loopholes in the supervisory/regulatory
framework for banks. The most dramatic of these loopholes is certainly the Too
Big To Fail (TBTF) problem: As a consequence of the way central banks and
Treasuries have managed the crisis, any large financial institution that encounters
financial problems in the future can expect to be bailed out by public authorities
on the ground that its resolution could provoke a systemic crisis. This article
proposes a solution to the TBTF problem, based on an Industrial Organization
approach. Instead of simply downsizing large financial institutions or imposing
stricter regulations based on newly developed measures of systemic risk exposures,
I propose to reform in depth the organization of interbank and money markets.
(JEL: G21, L51)
1. Introduction
This article puts forward a simple reform that
could lead to the elimination- once and for all-
of the Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF) problem. This
TBTF problem is not the only reason for re-
forming in depth the financial supervisory/regu-
latory system in the Us and elsewhere, but it is
probably the most frightening. I believe its solu-
tion should be at the top of the regulatory agen-
da
1
.
The current financial crisis has revealed many
other loopholes in the supervisory/regulatory
system. however the main lesson that can be
drawn from the actions taken (and statements
made) by public authorities during this crisis is
1
This view seems to be shared by Chairman Bernanke,
who states in a recent speech (2009) that “the belief of mar-
ket participants that a particular firm is considered too big
to fail has many undesirable effects. For instance, it re-
duces market discipline and encourages excessive risk-
taking by the firm. It also provides an artificial incentive for
firms to grow, in order to be perceived as too big to fail. And
it creates an unlevel playing field with smaller firms, which
may not be regarded as having implicit government support.
Moreover, government rescues of too-big-to-fail firms can
be costly to taxpayers, as we have seen recently. Indeed, in
the present crisis, the too-big-to-fail issue has emerged as
an enormous problem”.
* This paper grew out of my keynote address in the An-
nual Meeting of the Finnish Economic Association, Turku,
February 5–6, 2009. A preliminary version of this paper
was presented in the 54th Economic Conference of the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Boston, Cape Cod (October 21–23,
2009) and in the 4
th
annual meeting of the Swiss Finance
Institute, Zürich (November 30
th
2009). I thank the partici-
pants in these meetings, and especially Ed Kane, for their
useful comments.
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that, in the future, any large financial institu-
tion that encounters financial problems can
expect to be bailed out by public authorities
on the grounds that it is TBTF (alternative
terms are Too Interconnected To Fail
2
, large
and Complex Banking Organization or system-
atically Important Financial Institution). The
turmoil that followed the failure of lehman
Brothers in september 2008 has indeed led
politicians to believe they had to commit to an
unconditional support of any troubled financial
institution whose failure might create major dis-
ruptions. Of course this commitment is a disas-
ter in terms of moral hazard and market disci-
pline. From a forward looking perspective, pub-
lic authorities could not convey a worse mes-
sage to market participants and bank manag-
ers.
a similar pattern emerged after the Continen-
tal Illinois bail-out in 1984
3
, and at the time, it
took more than five years for market discipline
to be somewhat restored
4
. But this bail-out was
a single event, and the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency of the time tried to maintain, as much as
he could, some ambiguity on which banks were
really TBTF
5
. Today there is no more ambigu-
ity: all large financial institutions will always be
rescued. Public authorities of G20 countries
have even agreed to publicly commit to a sys-
tematical bail-out. Unless resolute reforms are
undertaken, it will probably take a very long
2
Perhaps a more appropriate wording is Too Politi-
cally Connected To Fail.
3
In May of 1984, Continental Illinois was bailed out by
the U.S. federal government. It was only the 7th largest
bank in the United States, but it was a money center bank
holding large deposits of hundreds of smaller banks. U.S.
supervisors feared that its failure could propagate toward
many of these smaller banks. The Comptroller of the Cur-
rency engineered a rescue that bailed out not only bank
depositors but also uninsured creditors of the bank holding
company. When called to testify by the Congress, the Comp-
troller admitted that other large banks might warrant simi-
lar support. Congressman McKinney uttered the now fa-
mous phrase: “Mr. Chairman, We have a new kind of bank.
It is called too big to fail. TBTF and it is a wonderful bank.”
(Hearings before the Subcommittee on Financial Institu-
tions, 1994, cited by Morgan and Stiroh, 2005)
4
Flannery and Sorescu [1996] show that banks’debt
spreads only started reflecting default risks around 1989,
after a regulatory transition toward letting market partici-
pants share the losses when a banking firm fails.
5
See Morgan and Stiroh (2005)
time to restore market discipline again. The
situation is even aggravated by the fact that an
indirect outcome of the crisis is an increased
concentration of the banking systems of many
countries, the surviving banks becoming even
bigger than before and in some countries at
least, close to be Too Big to Be Bailed out.
In a premonitory book, stern and Feldman
(2004) rightly identified TBTF as a major regu-
latory issue
6
and proposed a whole range of
policy measures in order to fix it. The reform
proposed here is complementary to their policy
recommendations, but I view it as a priority. It
is in some way radical, but fits very well into
the general movement toward relying more on
central counterparty clearing for interbank trad-
ing and derivatives markets.
another major source of concern for public
authorities is the complete lack of resiliency of
interbank and money markets during the recent
crisis. It is amazing to see how some shocks to
the relatively small subprime market could lead
to the complete dry-up of liquidity markets for
more than a year. This paper argues that this
lack of resiliency is due to a fundamental mis-
take in the way these markets were conceived.
To a large extent, the contagions phenomena
that took place on these markets were the neces-
sary outcomes of the passive attitude of banking
supervisors, who have let large banks develop
an enormous and opaque nexus of bilateral ob-
ligations. In rochet and Tirole (1996), Jean Ti-
role and I explored the theoretical justifications
of such a decentralized organization of the in-
terbank markets and found only one possible
answer: market discipline. More precisely we
found that the only possible explanation why
prudential authorities could have let banks or-
ganize the trade of their reserves vis- à-vis the
central bank in an OTC fashion was the hope to
promote what we called peer monitoring i.e.
the mutual surveillance of banks by their com-
petitors. however this hope was misplaced: the
price to pay for this mutual surveillance, name-
6
Their point of view was criticized (before the crisis)
by Mishkin (2005). The abstract of his paper claims that:”
Stern and Feldman overstate the importance of the too big
to fail problem and do not give enough credit to the FDICIA
legislation of 1991 for improving bank regulation and su-
pervision.”
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ly the risk of contagion, was too heavy. Market
discipline could only have worked if public au-
thorities could have convinced market partici-
pants that they would not intervene if a system-
ic crisis occurred, which revealed not credible.
a logical consequence of this result, which
we did not defend forcefully enough in rochet
and Tirole (1996), is that the current, decentral-
ized, organization of interbank markets has a
huge cost (contagion risk
7
) but no benefit. Mar-
ket discipline does not work for the interbank
market, not only because of the strong likeli-
hood of a public bail-out in case of a crisis but
also because of the faulty conception of its in-
dustrial organization. Decentralized trading of
bank reserves has a major drawback: it bundles
liquidity risk with counterparty risk, which
makes price discovery almost impossible.
The plan of the rest of this article is the fol-
lowing. section 2 reviews traditional recom-
mendations about the division of labor across
regulatory agencies. section 3 examines what is
left of these recommendations after the crisis.
section 4 is the core of the paper: it defends the
view that public authorities should protect mar-
kets not banks. section 5 presents, in a non
technical way, the theoretical analysis of the
choice between centralized trading and system-
ic risk; section 6 concludes.
2. The division of labor across
regulatory agencies
2.1 International Comparisons
Prior to the subprime crisis, several papers had
compared institutional arrangements for the su-
pervision of the financial sector and examined
the impact of specific regulatory and supervi-
sory practices on the performance of banking
sectors. among these papers are Goodhart and
schoenmaker (1995), who examine the super-
7
As I explain below, systemic risk has roughly two com-
ponents: contagion risk, which is largely an artifact of the
faulty organization of interbank markets and systematic
risk, which is due to macroeconomic shocks and can be
reduced by macro-prudential measures aimed at reducing
pro-cyclicality of regulatory requirements and correlation
of banking exposures.
visory role of central banks in 24 different
countries, and llewellyn (1999) who studies the
scope of supervisory powers for the financial
authorities in 123 countries. More recently,
building on a rich data set drawn from a World
Bank survey (covering 107 countries) Barth,
Caprio and levine (2001) oppose two compet-
ing views on regulation: the helping-hand ap-
proach, which considers that regulation endeav-
ors to correct market failures, and the grabbing-
hand approach, which considers that opportun-
istic governments use regulation to support their
constituencies. They test these theories on their
data set. Their empirical results are more in line
with the second interpretation. as a conse-
quence, they advocate in favor of encouraging
regulatory and supervisory practices that im-
prove transparency and corporate governance.
Using the same data set, Barth, Dopico, nolle
and Wilcox (2002) find that the countries where
the central bank has the monopoly of supervi-
sory responsibilities are typically characterized
by small banks, large government ownership in
the banking sector and high entry costs into
banking. however they do not find any signifi-
cant impact of the country’s choice of integrat-
ed versus fragmented supervision on the per-
formance of the country’s banking sector.
Kane (2004) discusses cross country differ-
ences in the design of the safety net for bank
depositors and stresses the importance of incor-
porating accountability and disaster planning
into this design. Freytag and Masciandaro
(2007) analyze the movement toward a single
financial authority (distinct from the central
bank) that has occurred in many countries, in-
cluding norway (1986), Denmark (1988), swe-
den (1991), UK (1997), Korea (1997). They
contrast this with the organizational set-up in
other countries, where supervisory powers are
shared among several authorities. They argue
that this multi-authority model is often associ-
ated with a powerful central bank, whereas the
opposite is true for countries with unified super-
vision. Di noia and Di Giorgio (2001) examine
whether or not banking supervision and mone-
tary policy tasks should be given to separate
agencies. They provide some evidence on the
comparison of economic performance of coun-
tries where such a functional separation is in
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place as opposed to countries where the central
bank is in charge of both monetary policy and
banking supervision. They find that inflation is
significantly higher and more volatile in coun-
tries with a single agency.
Just before the crisis, the Financial stability
Institute (FsI) undertook a survey of 125 coun-
tries about the evolution and current state of
institutional arrangements for financial sector
supervision in 2006. half of the 125 countries
experienced a change in either the domicile of
their banking supervision authority or the level
of integration of supervisory functions across
major sectors of the domestic financial system,
or both. however, the FsI survey finds that
there is still a majority of countries where cen-
tral banks are responsible for banking supervi-
sion (83 of the 125 countries). Over the last 20
years, there was a significant decline in the
number of banking authorities domiciled within
the Ministry of Finance and an increase in the
number of banking authorities domiciled in a
separate supervisory agency. In some regions
the direction of change is towards greater inte-
gration of financial sector supervision, particu-
larly in europe and latin america. however
non-integrated authorities remained the domi-
nant category in 2006. The shift towards greater
integration of financial sector supervision is of-
ten associated with moving the banking super-
vision authority outside the central bank. how-
ever, most central banks have recently created a
financial stability department. supervisors are
typically supposed to use memoranda of under-
standing (MOUs)
8
and informal contacts to deal
with cross-sector and cross-border issues. how-
ever many respondents to the FsI survey re-
garded the harmonization of supervisory ap-
proaches across financial sectors and the lack of
a consistent regulatory framework across finan-
cial sectors as key challenges for supervisors.
8
Dewatripont, Rochet and Tirole(2009) insists on the
lack of cooperation between Belgian and Dutch authorities
in the treatment of the ING and Fortis problems. They argue
that MOUs revealed totally useless.
2.2 The Costs and Benefits of Integrated
Supervision
Barth, Dopico, nolle and Wilcox (2002) clas-
sify the theoretical arguments for and against a
single banking supervisor. It seems that the
main benefit of integrated supervision is to
avoid gaps that can arise with a regime based on
several agencies, and thus to limit regulatory
arbitrage possibilities by banks. This view is
shared by Chairman Bernanke (2009):” we must
ensure a robust framework – both in law and
practice – for consolidated supervision of all
systemically important financial firms organ-
ized as holding companies. The consolidated
supervisors must have clear authority to moni-
tor and address safety and soundness concerns
in all parts of the organization, not just the hold-
ing company. Broad-based application of the
principle of consolidated supervision would
also serve to eliminate gaps in oversight that
would otherwise allow risk-taking to migrate
from more-regulated to less-regulated sectors.
a consolidated supervisor may also benefit
from economies of scope and scale and be in a
better position to curb the behavior of big
banks.”
The counterpart to this argument is that con-
solidation may give too much power to the sin-
gle supervisor. In an empirical study published
just before the crisis, Cihak and Podpiera (2006)
find that integrated supervision is typically as-
sociated with a higher quality of supervision but
that whether the integrated supervision is lo-
cated inside or outside the central bank does not
really matter for the quality of supervision. In
any case my personal view is that we should be
more concerned about the excessive power of
large and Connected Financial Institutions
rather than that of the authority that is supposed
to oversee them.
Barth, Dopico, nolle and Wilcox (2002) also
classify the theoretical arguments for and
against having the central bank supervise the
banks. having the possibility to use supervisory
information to act quickly and effectively in
times of crisis is clearly a major benefit. Using
data for 104 bank failures in 24 countries during
the 1980s, Goodhart and schoenmaker (1995)
find that countries where the central bank is in
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charge of banking supervision had fewer bank
failures. On the cost side, conflicts of interest
between financial stability and monetary policy
are often mentioned as an argument against giv-
ing supervisory powers to the central bank. In
fact this argument is not well articulated: in the
absence of accountability problems, a single
agency would be in a better position to trade-off
between several objectives. It is because inde-
pendence and accountability are absolutely nec-
essary for supervisory agencies that a single
objective for each separate agency is typically
better than a single agency with multiple objec-
tives.
2.3 Prudential Supervision: Micro Vs Macro
The traditional regulatory doctrine before the
crisis held that prudential regulation of banks is
essentially justified by two reasons:
• protecting depositors and limiting the lia-
bility of deposit insurance funds:
This is micro prudential regulation, analyzed
in detail by Dewatripont and Tirole (1993).
Without going into the detail, the important
ingredients of an efficient micro-prudential
regulation are: independence and accounta-
bility of supervisors, use of market discipline,
a lender of last resort policy governed by the
Bagehot principles, no injection of public
money, and cost minimizing resolution of
failures. This doctrine is best illustrated by
the Us FDICIa, which articulated very clear-
ly the notion of Prompt Corrective action.
• protecting the banking and financial “sys-
tems”:
This is macro prudential regulation. It aims
at avoiding contagious failures, spillovers and
major disruptions to the banking and finan-
cial system. It justifies renouncing to all the
principles stated above, i.e. introducing ex-
ceptions to FDICIa, possible intervention of
the Treasury, liquidity injections by the cen-
tral bank, and (temporarily?) abandoning the
recourse to market discipline.
This duality between micro and macro pru-
dential regulations is well illustrated by the doc-
trine employed by the Bank of Canada (1995)
in its lender-of-last-resort policies:
“The Bank of Canada has three distinct roles
as a lender of last resort (LLR):
• The Bank facilitates the settlement of pay-
ments systems by routinely extending overnight
credit to participants in the Large Value Transfer
System (LVTS) through the Standing Liquidity
Facility (SLF), to cover temporary end-of-day
shortfalls in settlement balances that can arise in
the daily settlement of payments. The Bank pro-
vides overnight loans at the Bank Rate, an inter-
est rate currently set at 25 basis points above the
target overnight rate. The Bank is required by the
Bank of Canada Act to secure all lending with
collateral. Collateral is valued at market value
less a discount. Discounts are applied mainly to
protect the Bank from market risk.
• For solvent financial institutions requiring
more substantial and prolonged credit, the Bank
can provide Emergency Lending Assistance
(ELA). ELA is intended to overcome a market
failure associated with financial institutions that
have a significant share of their liabilities as
“deposits” (fixed-value promises to pay, re-
deemable at very short notice) and whose assets
are generally highly illiquid. The Bank of Can-
ada Act requires that such lending be secured
by collateral pledged by the borrowing institu-
tion. The collateral eligible to secure credit
from the SLF is the same as that eligible for
intraday credit in the Large Value Transfer Sys-
tem. It is the policy of the Bank to lend only to
institutions that are judged to be solvent in or-
der to mitigate moral hazard that can arise from
such potential intervention, and to avoid dam-
aging the interests of unsecured creditors.
• In conditions of severe and unusual stress
on the financial system more generally, the Bank
has authority to provide liquidity through out-
right purchases of a wide variety of securities
issued by any Canadian or foreign entities, in-
cluding non-financial firms. In other words, the
Bank has the authority to provide liquidity to a
broad range of financial and non-financial in-
stitutions when the Governor of the Bank judg-
es that such transactions are justified to safe-
guard the safety and soundness of Canada’s fi-
nancial system.”
This is all very fine. alas, the subprime crisis
has shown that these doctrines were largely in-
sufficient.
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3. What’s left of prudential doctrines
after the crisis
One of the striking features of the subprime cri-
sis was that shocks to the relatively small sub-
prime market could provoke the distress of vital
parts of the financial infrastructure, especially
interbank and money markets. This over-reac-
tion is largely due to the uncertainty of market
participants about the impact that a decline in
real-estate prices and the beginning of a reces-
sion might have on a sizable fraction of the as-
sets held by large banks. These large banks are
the main players in these liquidity markets,
which are vital to modern economies.
Confronted with this freezing of money mar-
kets, central banks did what they could to sub-
stitute these failing markets. They organized
several kinds of lending facilities and de facto
provided the intermediation of a large part of
liquidity flows among banks and also between
banks and some non-banks. In parallel, public
authorities, all over the world, injected large
amounts of capital and provided a whole spec-
trum of guarantees to financial institutions, in
the hope of restarting these vital liquidity mar-
kets. These (largely improvised) interventions
were very costly, and only partially succeeded
to restart liquidity markets and to restore confi-
dence. But the important message is that the
justification for public intervention was not so
much avoiding contagious failures but rather
maintaining the integrity of some parts of finan-
cial infrastructure, that are deemed “vital” to the
economy.
as for the future, envisaging less costly ways
to maintain financial stability should be on the
top of the reform agenda. In particular, it would
be disastrous to let market participants consider
that all large financial institutions will always
be rescued (and their creditors insured) if they
are again in a situation of financial distress.
Taxpayers of most countries will not be willing
to accept a second dose of the sort of blanket
guarantees that governments have committed to
provide to large financial institutions, in the
hope to maintain financial stability.
Chairman Bernanke (2009) has recently pro-
posed a strategy for dealing with systemic risk,
a strategy that comprises four elements: ad-
dressing the TBTF problem, strengthening fi-
nancial infrastructure, limiting pro-cyclicality
of regulatory policies and accounting rules, and
finally creating a systemic risk regulator. The
present paper does not address the third ques-
tion but focuses on the three others and suggests
that they could be addressed simultaneously by
adopting what I call an “Industrial Organization
approach” to the TBTF problem.
as I already argued, the main issue is how to
find a way to improve supervision of systemi-
cally critical firms and to strengthen the resil-
ience of the financial system to the unwinding
of such a large firm. This implies that any “sys-
tematically important” firm must receive espe-
cially close supervisory oversight of its risk-
taking, risk management, and financial condi-
tion, and be held to high capital and liquidity
standards.
This poses the major difficulty of identifying
these TBTF firms. What criteria should be used
to determine when a firm (not necessarily a
bank) is TBTF and when it is not? also which
agency should be given the authority to decide
on this matter? a promising approach for solv-
ing the first question is the methodology pro-
posed by Tarashev, Borio and Tsatsaronis (2009)
for the allocation of system-wide risk to each
individual institution, in line with its systemic
importance. This methodology combines statis-
tical risk measures with the shapley value, a
widely used solution concept in cooperative
game theory. This approach could be used to
provide guidelines for defining which firms
should be subject to an alternative regime as
systemically important, and the process for in-
voking that regime. a more pragmatic solution
could be to adapt the procedures used for invok-
ing the so-called systemic risk exception under
FDICIa.
as for the second question (which agency
should decide on which institutions are system-
ic), many major central banks around the world
already have an explicit statutory basis for their
oversight of critical payment and settlement
systems. as I argue in more detail below, a nat-
ural corollary is that these central banks should
also be in charge of systemic risk supervision,
and in particular should decide on which insti-
tutions are systemic and which are not. This is
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not the current situation in the U.s, where the
Federal reserve does not have explicit oversight
authority for systemically important payment
and settlement systems. reforming this might
be reasonable.
The main lesson that can be drawn from the
behavior of public authorities is that protecting
financial infrastructure, i.e. the institutions that
support trading, payments, clearing, and settle-
ment has become the fundamental reason be-
hind macro-prudential regulation and supervi-
sion. The aim here is not only to make the fi-
nancial system as a whole more resilient, but
also to reduce the need for future government
intervention.
4. My proposal: protecting platforms,
not banks
4.1 Giving a precise financial stability
mandate to central banks
The main objective of macro-prudential reg-
ulation should be to protect platforms (i.e.
vital parts of financial infrastructure) not in-
dividual banks! Many central banks are given
the rather vague objective of “maintaining fi-
nancial stability”, which gives them too much
discretion and opens the door to lobbying by
large institutions and political pressure. This
could be limited if central banks were given a
more precise mandate. The one I propose here
is to guarantee the integrity of a precise list
of financial markets and infrastructures that
are deemed “vital”: interbank (both secured
and repo) markets, money markets, as well as
some derivative markets and large value pay-
ment systems. To do so, it would be useful to
learn from the experience of private clearing
houses, which have developed sophisticated
policies for protecting themselves again the fail-
ure of their participants.
4.2 Generalizing Central Counterparty
Clearing
Many commentators have argued that the lack
of transparency of interbank exposures on mon-
ey markets and derivatives have played a major
role in the propagation of the crisis. OTC trans-
actions are typically very opaque and can be a
major source of systemic risk. secretary Geithn-
er has fostered the development of central clear-
ing platforms for credit derivatives. along the
same lines, a recent paper by Pennachi (2009)
discusses deposit insurance-related reforms that
would improve the efficiency of the financial
system. The first reform he identifies is “to
mitigate TBTF by reducing counterparty risk
via centralized clearing (and possibly exchange-
trading) of derivatives”. see also Bernanke
(2009): “To help alleviate counterparty credit
concerns, regulators are also encouraging the
development of well-regulated and prudently
managed central clearing counterparties for
OTC trades. Just last week, we approved the
application for membership in the Federal re-
serve system of ICe Trust, a trust company that
proposes to operate as a central counterparty
and clearinghouse for CDs transactions“.
Bernanke (2009) puts forward a similar pro-
posal for repo markets:” enhancing the resil-
ience of the tri-party repurchase agreement
(repo) market, in which the primary dealers and
other major banks and broker-dealers obtain
very large amounts of secured financing from
money market mutual funds and other short-
term, risk-averse sources of funding. For some
time, market participants have been working to
develop a contingency plan for handling a loss
of confidence in either of the two clearing banks
that facilitate the settlement of tri-party repos.
recent experience demonstrates the need for
additional measures to enhance the resilience of
these markets, particularly as large borrowers
have experienced acute stress. The Federal re-
serve’s Primary Dealer Credit Facility, launched
in the wake of the Bear stearns collapse and
expanded in the aftermath of the lehman Broth-
ers bankruptcy, has stabilized this critical mar-
ket, and market confidence has been maintained.
however, this program was adopted under our
emergency powers to address unusual and exi-
gent circumstances. Therefore, more-permanent
reforms are needed. For example, it may be
worthwhile considering the costs and benefits
of a central clearing system for this market,
given the magnitude of exposures generated and
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the vital importance of the market to both deal-
ers and investors.”
My proposal would go further by extending
the centralized model not only to derivatives
and repo markets but also to unsecured inter-
bank markets: I believe that more centralization
could be an efficient way to stabilize interbank
markets: for example banks would be offered
the choice between a centralized market for li-
quidity, which would be insured and supervised
by the Central Bank, and OTC transactions that
would remain risky and, as such, associated
with regulatory capital charges. as for money
markets, it should be possible to move also to-
ward more centralization. as Bernanke puts it
(2009): “In light of the importance of money
market mutual funds – and, in particular, the
crucial role they play in the commercial paper
market, a key source of funding for many busi-
nesses – policymakers should consider how to
increase the resiliency of those funds that are
susceptible to runs. One approach would be to
impose tighter restrictions on the instruments in
which money market mutual funds can invest,
potentially requiring shorter maturities and in-
creased liquidity. a second approach would be
to develop a limited system of insurance for
money market mutual funds that seek to main-
tain a stable net asset value.”
4.3 Central counterparty clearing: principles
and risk management procedures
In its study on the safety and efficiency of de-
rivatives markets, the Commission of the euro-
pean Communities, (2009) states that “CCP
clearing is the most effective way of reducing
credit risk and is broadly feasible in all market
segments” and rightly points that “the near col-
lapse of Bear sterns in March 2008, the default
of lehman Brothers on september 15 2008, and
the bail-out of aIG on the next day highlighted
the fact that OTC derivatives in general and
credit derivatives in particular carry systemic
implications for financial markets
The three institutions mentioned above were
important players in the OTC derivatives mar-
ket, either as dealers or users of OTC deriva-
tives or both.”
The guiding principle of central counter par-
ty clearing (CCP) is that after two parties have
agreed on a trade, the clearing platform steps
into each trade by acting as counterparty to each
side. This is called novation, a mechanism by
which the platform essentially becomes “the
buyer to every seller and the seller to every
buyer”. This mechanism allows the netting of
multilateral (not only bilateral) exposures but
also the centralization of collateral, which intro-
duces diversification effects, especially if there
is some degree of cross-pledging between dif-
ferent types of markets.
To reduce the risk and possible consequences
of a default by a clearing member or one of its
customers, CCPs have developed several risk
management procedures. The primary protec-
tion is provided by initial margin, a deposit
which clearing members are required to place
in an account with the CCP. CCPs typically also
make margin calls to ensure that they remain
protected over time as prices change. They usu-
ally also have access to additional default re-
sources, such as mutual guarantee funds or in-
surance cover, and require clearing members to
fulfill financial requirements to reduce the like-
lihood of default.
To protect themselves and the clearing house
against client defaults, members are generally
required to set a minimum level of margin for
their clients according to rules set down by the
clearing house. De facto, CCP failures have
been extremely rare. Knott and Mills (2002)
find only three cases: Paris in 1973, Kuala
lumpur in 1983, and hong Kong in 1987.
In principle, CCPs mark-to-market positions
daily. Thus they should be exposed only to the
extent that a one-day price movement exhausts
the entire margin of a clearing member. In prac-
tice, CCPs may be exposed over a longer period
as it may take time to decide whether a member
should be declared in default, and then to close-
out positions. several studies have attempted to
quantify the potential exposure of clearing
houses over one or more days. some of these
models are purely statistical, and pre-specify
acceptable coverage levels in a purely exoge-
nous fashion. By contrast, Fenn and Kupiec
(1993) develop a model that aims at minimising
the total sum of margin, settlement costs and the
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cost of settlement failure. Clearing houses need
to trade-off several objectives when they set
their margins. requiring high margins and good
quality collateral is costly to members. Marking
positions to market and settling gains or losses,
on either a daily or more frequent basis, also
entails costs. To arrive at an optimal margin
level the clearing house must balance these
costs against the potential losses resulting from
a default of contracts.
4.4 The benefits of central counterparty
clearing
By helping to manage counterparty risk and by
providing netting services, CCPs allows market
participants to economize on collateral, com-
pared to what they would otherwise need to
hold to ensure equivalent protection in bilater-
ally cleared markets. regulators also often rec-
ognize the reduction in counterparty risk by
allowing clearing members to hold less capital
than if they were exposed directly to other mar-
ket participants. Clearing members may also
reduce the resources spent on monitoring indi-
vidual counterparties, insofar as their actual
counterparty is the CCP. Through the design of
clearing members margining and collateral re-
quirements, CCPs reduce the probability of im-
mediate propagation to solvent members of
losses incurred by the insolvent one.
Moreover a CCP clearly improves transpar-
ency, which explains why reforms are often re-
sisted by those currently enjoying an informa-
tion advantage (i.e. major OTC derivatives deal-
ers). as exemplified by the lehman failure,
when a major player in bilaterally cleared de-
rivatives markets fails, it is not immediately ap-
parent to the remaining market participants who
are absorbing the losses, how big they are and
how the failed firm’s counterparties are affected.
The effects of this uncertainty can be devastat-
ing on market confidence, as illustrated by Bear
sterns, lehman and aIG. This uncertainty is
mitigated by a CCP that has effective means of
allocating losses and no incentive to use the in-
formation it holds for its own profits. This neu-
trality alleviates the information concerns of
market participants. a CCP also increases op-
erational efficiency, by centralizing the monitor-
ing of trades and reducing potential for dis-
putes.
CCPs have proven to be resilient even under
stressed market conditions and showed their
ability to ensure normal market functioning in
case of failure of a major market player. a case
in point is the successful unwinding of the inter-
est rate swap positions left open following the
default of lehman Brothers. This was engi-
neered by lCh.Clearnet, who operates swap-
Clear, currently the dominant provider of CCP
clearing services for interest rate swaps. It is
interesting to say a few words about the default
management process of swapClear, as described
in the staff report of the Commission of the eu-
ropean Communities (2009). When a clearing
member of swapClear defaults, lCh.Clearnet
conducts auctions for selling the defaulter’s
portfolio. all swapClear members are required
to bid in these auctions. If there are losses, they
are allocated as follows:
(i) the defaulting clearing members initial
margin,
(ii) the defaulting clearing member’s default
fund contribution,
(iii) part of lCh.Clearnet’s profits,
(iv) other clearing members default fund
contributions,
(v) further fixed cash contributions from the
other clearing members, and
(vi) lCh.Clearnet’s share capital.
This process proved its worth following the
default of lehman Brothers. lehman’s $10 tril-
lion portfolio of 66,000 trades across five cur-
rencies was replaced and less than 50% of leh-
man Brother’s initial margins was required to
hedge the risk, manage and auction the posi-
tion.
4.5 Giving the central bank the right to decide
who belongs to the “club” and who does
not
Typically, private clearing houses distinguish
between their members, who have a privileged
status, and ordinary participants. In counterpart
to their privileged status, the clearing members
are supposed to implement a set of risk mitiga-
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tion policies, such as collateral and capital re-
quirements and bilateral credit limits. For exam-
ple members are typically required to make an
upfront deposit to a default fund supposed to
cover losses that exceed the defaulting mem-
ber’s margins. I believe Central Banks could
adopt a similar policy, and condition the direct
participation of financial institutions to the “vi-
tal” part of the financial infrastructure on spe-
cial requirements (such as solvency and liquid-
ity requirements) that would go beyond the
standard requirements imposed on deposit tak-
ing institutions by micro-prudential regulators.
In effect, my proposal would aim at replacing
the notion of “systemically important institu-
tion” by that of “systemically important plat-
form”. such platforms would only be directly
accessible to a group of “officially recognized
financial institutions” that would have to com-
ply with special regulatory requirements and
would be directly supervised by the central
bank. The status of “officially recognized finan-
cial institution” could be revoked by the central
bank if these special regulatory requirements
are not satisfied. a special resolution procedure
would be created for these institutions, so that
the central bank has the legal powers to close it
down, or at least restrict its activities before it
is too late. again this is line with the position
recently expressed by Chairman Bernanke
(2009): “The United states also needs improved
tools to allow the orderly resolution of a sys-
temically important nonbank financial firm,
including a mechanism to cover the costs of the
resolution. In most cases, federal bankruptcy
laws provide an appropriate framework for the
resolution of nonbank financial institutions.
however, this framework does not sufficiently
protect the public’s strong interest in ensuring
the orderly resolution of non-depository finan-
cial institutions when a failure would pose sub-
stantial systemic risks. Improved resolution
procedures for these firms would help reduce
the too-big-to-fail problem by narrowing the
range of circumstances that might be expected
to prompt government intervention to keep the
firm operating.”
These “officially recognized financial institu-
tions” would be the equivalent of existing “sys-
temically important institutions”, who have ac-
cess to special liquidity assistance facilities and
possible government guarantees in case of dis-
tress. But there would be an important differ-
ence: it is the central bank that would choose
who belongs to the club and who does not! If
the advantages associated with membership far
exceeded the costs, the threat of revoking the
status would work as an important disciplining
device. OTC markets would still be active but,
since they would be penalized by regulation, it
is likely that they would become small, and
therefore not in a position to jeopardize the en-
tire system.
5. A conceptual analysis of interbank
lending and systemic risk
In an article published in 1996, Jean Tirole and
I analyzed the trade-offs involved in the man-
agement of systemic risk on interbank markets.
This section summarizes, in a non-technical
fashion, the main conclusions of our analysis,
which already contained the main elements of
what I call today the “Industrial Organization
approach” to the TBTF problem.
a first, important, remark is that systemic
risk is a concern only in a decentralized envi-
ronment in which banks incur credit risk in their
mutual transactions. like in many crises of the
past, governments have tried to resolve the cur-
rent crisis (ex post) by insuring most of inter-
bank claims, rescuing distressed banks through
discount loans, the facilitation of purchase-and-
assumptions, nationalizations, and so forth.
however, such policies do not provide proper
(ex ante) incentives for interbank monitoring
and may lead to substantial cross-subsidies from
healthy banks to frail ones through a govern-
ment-mediated mechanism. an alternative
method of prevention of systemic risk would
consist in centralizing banks’ liquidity manage-
ment. The Fed funds market could be organized
as an anonymous double auction (to which the
central bank could participate to manage global
liquidity), in which each bank would trade with
the central bank rather than with other banks.
The central bank would then have better control
over interbank positions and would further pre-
vent systemic risk on the interbank market.
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last, bank transactions on derivative markets
could be protected through sufficient collateral
so that, again, banks would not grant each other
credit. Whether the government is affected by a
bank failure in a centralized system depends on
the constraints it puts on banks, but, in any case,
centralization, like insurance, eliminates sys-
temic risk.
The current system of interbank linkages suf-
fers from its hybrid nature: On one hand, banks
engage in largely decentralized mutual lending.
On the other hand, government intervention,
voluntary or involuntary, destroys the very ben-
efit of a decentralized system, namely, peer
monitoring among banks. If one does not be-
lieve that the social value of the fine informa-
tion that banks have or may acquire about each
other exceeds the cost of systemic risk, then
there is no particular reason to encourage de-
centralized interactions among banks. To stress
the point that a decentralized operation of inter-
bank lending must be motivated by peer moni-
toring, consider the following (alternative) plau-
sible explanation of interbank lending: some
banks, perhaps due to their regional implanta-
tion, are good at collecting deposits, but have
poor investment opportunities. In contrast, some
other banks, such as the money center banks,
have plenty of such opportunities or else are
sufficiently large to afford the large fixed costs
associated with complex derivative and other
high-tech financial markets. It then seems natu-
ral for the former banks to lend to the latter. Yet,
that a deposit-collecting bank should incur a
loss when the borrowing bank defaults, as is
implied by interbank lending, is not a foregone
conclusion. If the relationship between the two
banks involves a transfer of funds but no moni-
toring, the operation described above could be
implemented in a more centralized, and proba-
bly better for prudential control, way. namely,
the deposit-collecting bank could pass the de-
posits on to the borrowing bank, while continu-
ing to service them (in the same way a bank
may continue to service mortgage loans it has
securitized without recourse to other banks).
The key difference with the interbank-loan in-
stitution is that the deposits made at the origi-
nating bank would, except to the eyes of the
depositors, become deposits of the receiving
bank. so, if the latter defaulted, losses would be
borne by the deposit insurance fund, and not by
the originating bank. This shows that a mere
specialization of banks into deposit-taking
banks and actively investing banks by itself
does not lead to the existence of decentralized
interbank lending.
One of the key messages conveyed by rochet
and Tirole (1996) is that the flexibility afforded
by decentralized interbank transactions can only
be justified by a desire by banking regulators to
promote effective peer monitoring by banks.
however the current crisis has shown that the
cost of encouraging this peer monitoring, name-
ly allowing the possibility of a systemic crisis
was far bigger than the potential benefit of this
peer monitoring, especially given the impossi-
bility for public authorities not to bailout large
insolvent institutions. Therefore centralizing the
payment system, the Fed funds market, and
other markets in which banks currently have
bilateral exposures would result in an equally
efficient allocation of liquidity among banks
and would facilitate prudential control.
6. Conclusion
Confronted with an unprecedented freezing of
interbank and monetary markets after septem-
ber 2008, central banks have reacted by assum-
ing a large part of the intermediation of liquid-
ity flows among banks, and de facto becoming
the clearing houses for the unsecured and for
the collateralized interbank markets. a natural
question is when this “temporary” situation will
cease and when interbank markets will “go back
to normal”.
similarly, governments have felt obliged to
set up extremely wide bailout packages includ-
ing public recapitalizations, purchase of toxic
assets, and subsidized lending to distressed in-
stitutions. When is this “exceptional” situation
supposed to terminate and what policies are
supposed to be implemented, in the future, for
dealing with TBTF institutions?
The response to these questions that is put
forward in this paper may seem radical, but it is
reasonably simple. These policies should be
pursued but under very strict regulatory control.
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The main idea is to reverse the balance of pow-
er between large banks and supervisors. Instead
of letting some banks grow big and opaque
enough to constitute a threat to the financial
system, my proposal is to let the central bank,
as the systemic risk supervisor, decide which
banks are safe enough to be allowed as mem-
bers of the financial “platforms” that are deemed
vital for the economy: large value payment sys-
tems, unsecured and collateralized interbank
markets and some derivative markets. The cen-
tral bank would receive an explicit mandate for
guaranteeing the continuity of these platforms
and for regulating membership.
If the advantages associated with member-
ship to these platforms far exceeded the costs,
the threat of revoking the member status would
work as an important disciplining device. OTC
markets would still be active but, thanks to the
protection measures put in place by the plat-
forms, these OTC markets would not anymore
be in a position to jeopardize the entire sys-
tem.
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